We study a class of sequential non-revelation mechanisms where hospitals make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it oers to doctors that either accept or reject them. We show that the mechanisms in this class are equivalent. They (weakly) implement the set of stable allocations in subgame perfect equilibrium. When all preferences are substitutable, the set of equilibria of the mechanisms in the class forms a lattice. Our results reveal a rst-mover advantage absent in the model without contracts. We apply our ndings to centralize school admissions problems, and we show obtaining pairwise stable allocations is possible through the immediate acceptance mechanism.
Introduction
In this paper, we study markets involving many-to-many relationships that can be expressed as contracts (see Hateld and Milgrom, 2005) . Relevant examples of these markets are the market for part-time workers or the allocation of specialty training slots for junior doctors in the UK. We nd that simple mechanisms where agents on one side of the market make take-it-orleave-it oers to the agents on the other side of the market are a robust way to implement stable allocations in this setting. We apply our results to the centralization of school admissions in a realistic many-to-many framework.
This nding is important. Many-to-many markets with contracts are a challenge for market design for several reasons. First, the nature of the contractual process makes these markets particularly complex. Also, centralizing the allocation of contracts in this context is dicult because no strategy-proof mechanism (even for one side of the market) exists that is able to generate stable allocations.
Many decentralized procedures share a simple structure. The agents on one side of the market (hospitals) simultaneously make oers to the agents on the other side (doctors) that either accept or reject them. This market structure is simple enough to promote participation while preventing the coordination problems that might arise in this setting and often disrupting the decentralized mechanism (see Triossi, 2009 , and Romero-Medina and Triossi, 2014) .
In this paper, we analyze the class of what we call take-it-or-leave-it oers mechanisms or T OM . This class includes all mechanisms such that in the rst stage, hospitals make simultaneous oers to doctors, and then groups of doctors sequentially accept or reject the oers. The order in which doctors choose can be arbitrary and even endogenous to the play, which is history dependent.
To make the exposition more transparent and to guarantee the comparability of our ndings with previous results, we start by presenting the simplest mechanism in the T OM family, the simultaneous acceptance mechanism or SAM . This procedure has two stages. In the rst stage, hospitals simultaneously oer contracts to doctors. In the second stage, doctors simultaneously select from among the oers received in the rst stage.
Although simple, the SAM mimics the decentralized procedures used in labor markets and college or school admissions. Therefore, our analysis contributes to identifying the basic forces at work in these settings, and captures the relevant interactions among hospitals and doctors.
We consider the subgame perfect equilibria (SP E from now on) in pure strategies of the game induced by the SAM . In this game, doctors have a unique best response: to accept the favorite set of contracts they are oered.
We prove each SP E outcome of the game is a pairwise stable allocation in this market without assumptions on the preferences of the agents. The converse is not true. Even when the preferences are substitutable, there are stable allocations that cannot be achieved as an SP E outcome of the SAM . This nding uncovers an important strategic dierence introduced by the use of contracts in matching markets. Indeed, Echenique and Oviedo (2006) nd that in many-to-many matching markets without contracts and with substitutable preferences, the set of stable matching coincides with the set of SP E outcomes of the SAM . The logic of our results is simple: without contracts, matching markets assign agents to agents. When contracts are available, each hospital can negotiate the details of the relationship with its counterparts. Therefore, ceteris paribus, each hospital will oer only its preferred contract from among the ones a doctor is willing to accept.
However, we prove that if enough competitive pressure is present, the SAM implements the set of stable allocations, generalizing the results in Echenique and Oviedo (2006) .
Our ndings highlight a problem that is both theoretical and conceptual.
Because the set of SP E outcomes can be a strict subset of the set of stable allocations, the existence of stable allocations does not guarantee the game has an SP E in pure strategies.
To tackle this issue, we start by observing that the sequential game induced by the SAM is equivalent to a simultaneous game Γ where only hospitals play, and the outcome is obtained by replacing the doctors with their unique best response (see Baron and Kalai, 1993 ). Then we prove an SP E in pure strategies exists when hospitals have substitutable preferences and doctors have unilateral substitutable preferences. This result extends the existence of pairwise stable allocations beyond the case, previously analyzed in the literature, of substitutable preferences (see Blair, 1988 , Pepa Risma, 2015, and Hateld and Kominers, 2017) .
We also show that if both sides of the market have substitutable preferences, the sets of the SP E outcomes of the game constitute a lattice. The lattice structure reects an opposition of interests between the two sides of the markets, within the equilibrium outcomes. This opposition of interests is consistent with the one found in the set of stable allocations (see Blair, 1988, and Pepa Risma, 2015) . We also nd a rst-mover advantage absent in the model without contracts. In fact, when the preferences of both sides of the market are substitutable and satisfy the law of aggregate demand (see Hateld and Milgrom, 2005) , the hospital-optimal stable allocation is an SP E outcome while the doctor-optimal stable allocation might not be an equilibrium outcome of the game.
After completing the study of the SAM , we extend our ndings to the entire T OM class, by proving all games in this class are equivalent. The set of SP E outcomes of the game induced by the SAM coincides with the set of SP E outcomes of the game induced by any of the mechanisms within the T OM class.
To conclude the paper, we consider the possibility of building a centralized assignment procedure able to result in stable allocations when the preferences of one side of the market are known and can be interpreted as priorities. This scenario exists, for instance, in school admissions problems. We nd the immediate acceptance mechanism guarantees the implementation of stable allocations in many-to-many environments with responsive school priorities because the game induced by the mechanism is equivalent to the game induced by the SAM . If schools' priorities are not responsive, the immediate acceptance mechanism fails to implement stable allocations. However, if priorities are at least substitutable, the one shot immediate acceptance mechanism yields stable allocations. This result also relies on the equivalence of the one-shot immediate acceptance mechanism and the SAM . This paper is rooted in the recent matching literature on sequential mechanisms, both in many-to-many and many-to-one markets. In that sense, our analysis on the SAM extends previous results on many-to-many matching markets without contracts in Sotomayor (2004) and Echenique and Oviedo (2006) to the framework of many-to-many matching markets with contracts.
Our analysis of sequential acceptances also extends the result on RomeroMedina and Triossi (2014) from the many-to-one to the many-to-many framework (see also Klaus and Kljin, 2016) .
Although many-to-many relations are common in bilateral markets, the strategic interaction of agents in decentralized many-to-many markets with contracts has not been fully analyzed. We have already mentioned the specialty training followed by junior doctors in the UK, where doctors have to arrange separate medical residencies and training positions with several hospitals (Roth, 1991) and part-time lecturers. However, we nd additional examples in other labor markets, for example, the market for school teachers in countries such as Argentina, Chile, and Italy. In these countries, teachers can work simultaneously in more than one school under dierent labor conditions.
Outside labor markets, we can mention relationships between health insurers and health care providers and the ones between car producers and auto parts suppliers as relevant examples of many-to-many markets with contracts.
The many-to-many framework can also be used to model the application stage of decentralized many-to-one markets. For example, Yenmez (2015) models the college admissions problem in the United States as a manyto-many matching model with contracts where applicants apply to several colleges and receive several acceptances before investing in reaching a nal decision. In this model, students get dierent acceptance packages with different tuition fees and nancial aid packages (scholarships, loans, grants, and work opportunities).
The school admissions problem has been traditionally studied as a many-toone problem. However, families may have more than one child, and students can be admitted in dierent conditions. In this case, the school admissions problem becomes an example of a market with contracts that ts in the scope of our analysis (see also Hateld and Kominers, 2017) .
Most of the markets we have mentioned are either totally or partially decentralized. But some of them are centralized using a revelation mechanism as the admission procedure in many school districts. However, the centralized procedures in place either ignore or underplay the many-to-many aspect of these markets. The analysis of decentralized procedures allows us to better understand the problem. In particular, we consider the dierent options available to the designer in a realistic many-to-many school admissions problem with contracts. We provide alternative mechanisms to build a centralized clearing house.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and notation. Section 3 presents the SAM and the implementation results for this mechanism. Section 4 extends our results to the class of T OM . Section 5 studies the possibility of centralizing the TOM family in markets with priorities on one side of the market. Finally, Section 6 concludes. The proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
In our model, a set of doctors seeks positions at dierent hospitals. The (nite) sets of hospitals and doctors are denoted by H and D, respectively. The set of agents will be denoted by N = H ∪ D. There is a nite set X of contracts. Each contract x ∈ X is associated with one doctor x D ∈ D and one hospital x H ∈ H. We assume each agent can sign multiple contracts. The null contract is denoted by ∅. An allocation is a set of contracts Y ⊆ X. Let Y be an allocation and let N ⊆ N . Let Y N = {y ∈ Y | {y H , y D } ∩ N = ∅} be the set of contracts that belong to Y and involve a member of N . With abuse of notation, for all n ∈ N , we will use Y n instead of Y {n} .
A contract is acceptable if it is strictly preferred to the null contract, and unacceptable if it is strictly worse than the null contract. The set of contracts that are acceptable to h is denoted by
Let C H (Y ) = h∈H C h (Y ) be the set of contracts chosen from Y by some hospital. Preference relations are extended to allocations in a natural way: Each choice functions C n is derived by a strict preference relation n , for all n ∈ N ; then it satises IRC. 1 Thus, for every Y ⊆ X and every z ∈ X \ Y ,
We dene 
(ii) The allocation Y is preferred to the allocation Z according to Blair's partial order for doctors, or
We assume each doctor can sign at most one contract with the same hospital, and vice versa. This assumption is called the unitarity assumption (see Kominers, 2012) and it is common in the literature (but see Pepa Risma, 2015, and Hateld and Kominers, 2017). We model the unitarity assumption (U A) by assuming the allocations where an agent n ∈ N signs more than one contract with the same counterpart are not acceptable to n. Formally, we assume that if Y ⊆ X is an allocation, and there exist y, z ∈ Y h , y = z for some h ∈ H (resp. y, z
Stability and substitutability
Stability is a key concept in market design. Gale and Shapley rst introduced it in their 1962 seminal paper. Theoretical and empirical ndings suggest markets that achieve stable outcomes are more successful than markets that do not achieve stable outcomes (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990, and Abdulkadiro §lu and Sönmez, 2013).
Stable allocations are identied by two requirements. The rst requirement is individual rationality. An allocation is individually rational if no agent wants to unilaterally cancel any of the assigned contracts.
Denition 2 An allocation Y is individually rational for agent n ∈ N if
The second requirement is that the allocation must not be blocked. Intuitively, a coalition blocks an allocation when the members of the coalition can protably renegotiate the contracts of the allocations.
A coalition of agents can block a given allocation in a variety of forms.
Denition 3 Let Y be an allocation for matching market M . A set of agents
• Blocks (Hateld and Kominers, 2017 
• Strongly blocks (Hateld and Kominers, 2017) Y if a set of contracts
The previous blocking conditions imply the following stability concepts.
Denition 4 Let Y be an allocation for matching market M .
• Y is pairwise stable if it is individually rational and no coalition exists that pairwise blocks it. The set of pairwise stable allocations is denoted by PS (M ).
• Y is stable if it is individually rational and no coalition exists that blocks it. The set of stable allocations is denoted by S (M ).
• Y is strongly stable if it is individually rational and no coalition exists that strongly blocks it. The set of strongly stable allocations is denoted by SS (M ).
As we move from pairwise stable allocation to strongly stable allocation, the set of potential blocking coalitions enlarges. Therefore, the set of surviving allocations shrinks. Thus, we have 
The preferences of hospital h are unilaterally substitutable if, whenever h rejects the contract z and that is the only contract with z D available, it still rejects the contract z when the choice set expands. Unilateral substitutable preferences are dened in the same way for doctors.
Denition 6 The preferences of hospital h, h are substitutable if there do not exist contracts x, z ∈ X and a set of contracts Y ⊆ X such that 
The preferences of hospital h are strongly substitutable if, whenever h chooses a contract y from a set of contracts Y and y ∈ Z, where C h (Y ) is a better set than C h (Z), then h chooses y from Z as well. Strongly substitutable preferences are dened in the same way for doctors.
In the paper, we also employ an additional condition called the law of aggregate demand.
Denition 8 Let n ∈ N . The preferences of agent n, n satisfy the law of
If the preferences of an agent satisfy the law of aggregate demand and new contracts become available, the agent will choose a (weakly) larger number of contracts.
Subgame perfect implementation
An extensive-form matching mechanism is an array G = (N, X, I, S, g),
where N is the set of players, I is the set of histories, and S is the strategy space. More precisely, S = n∈N S n , where S n = i∈I S i n for all n ∈ N . Set S i = n∈N S i n . Histories and strategies are linked by the following property:
An initial history i 0 ∈ I exists, and every history i ∈ I is represented by a nite sequence
history i r−1 precedes history i r and that history i r precedes history i r+1 .
The set W = {w ∈ I | there is no i ∈ I proceeding w} is the set of terminal histories. Given the initial history, every strategy prole s ∈ S denes a unique terminal history w s . The outcome function g : W → X species an outcome allocation for each terminal history, and hence for each strategy prole s. With abuse of notation, we use g (s) to denote g (w s ). Given , (G, ) constitutes an extensive-form game.
, where i is the initial history, I (i) = {i ∈ I | i precedes i} and S (i) = i ∈I(i) S i . Let s ∈ S (i). Given the initial history i, strategy s species a unique terminal history, w s . The outcome function is dened by g i (s) = g (w s ). Given s ∈ S and i ∈ I, let s (i) ∈ S (i) be the strategy prescribed by s once i is reached. Formally, if s = s
. With abuse of notation, we will identify a subgame G (i) with its initial history i.
An SP E is a strategy prole that induces a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. Formally, s * is an SP E if for all i ∈ I and for all n ∈ N :
an SP E outcome of (G, ) , and the set of SP E outcomes of (G, ) is denoted by SP E (G, ). Let M be a set of matching markets, and let Φ : M X be a correspondence. An extensive-form matching mecha-
which is if every SP E outcome of (Γ, ) belongs to Φ (H, D, X, ) and for all contracts x ∈ Φ (M ) , an SP E of (G, ) exists yielding x as outcome.
An extensive-form matching mechanism G weakly implements
, which is if every SP E outcome of (G, ) belongs to Φ (M ). Throughout the paper, we consider only equilibria in pure strategies.
Simultaneous Acceptance Mechanism
In this section, we analyze the simultaneous acceptance mechanism.
The SAM is a natural extension of the mechanism studied in Sotomayor The SAM is described by the following procedure:
1. Oers. Each hospital h oers contracts to some doctors. Let X 1 (h) ⊆ X h be the set of contracts oered by hospital h. If h does not make
2. Choice. Each doctor selects a set of contracts from among the ones she was oered. Let
In the rst stage of the game, the strategy set of hospital h is 2
where doctors have to play is completely characterized by sets of contracts proposed by each hospital. Formally,
is the set of contracts that hospital proposed in the history preceding z. Let 
we denote the set of all of its subsets.
be the set of oers doctor d receives in this subgame. We will use {X i 2 (d)} d∈D to denote the prole of strategies of the doctors at subgame i ∈ I \ (i 0 ∪ W ).
A strategy is given by s = (
Results
We rst characterize doctors' optimal behavior. At the second stage of the game, doctors have a unique best response, namely, to accept the best set of contracts from among the ones being oered. Formally:
Lemma 1 Consider the game induced by the SAM when preferences are
. Then doctors have a unique best response: In the case of non-substitutable preferences, we can nd SP E outcomes that are pairwise stable, but not stable as the following example shows.
Example 1 Let us assume
denote contracts between d 1 and h r , r = 1, 2. Let z r andz r denote contracts between d 2 and h r , r = 1, 2. Assume the preferences of the agents are the following:
hr : {x r , z r } , {x r } , {z r } , {x r } , {z r } , r = 1, 2;
The preferences of the hospitals are not substitutable. The SAM yields {x 2 ,z 1 } as SP E outcome, which is pairwise stable but not stable.
Markets with and without contracts
We can dene a many-to-many matching market without contracts as a market where |X h ∩ X d | = 1 for all h ∈ H and d ∈ D. Echenique and Oviedo (2006) analyze the SAM in this framework (see also Sotomayor, 2004 
We can assume that, for example, x i , x i andx are contracts that pay a salary of $200,000, $175,000, and $150,000 a year, respectively, and all other contract terms are identical.
In Example 2, the hospital prefers to pay less and the doctor prefers to be paid more. Only the $150,000 contract is an SP E outcome of the SAM mechanism where the hospital makes the oer. Only the $200,000 contract is an SP E outcome of the SAM mechanism where the doctor makes the oer. 5 The set of SP E allocations depends on who is making the oers. Therefore, Example 2 highlights another dierence that emerges from the 5 One might conjecture the set of stable allocations is the union of the SP E outcomes of the game where hospitals make oers and of SP E outcomes of the game where doctors make oers. This conjecture is not true. Notice that in Example 2, the $175,000 contract is not an SP E outcome of any of the two games.
use of contracts. When no contracts exist, the set of SP E allocations is independent of who makes the oers.
Notice that in Example 2, the contracts where the doctor is paid $175,000 and $200,000 are unilaterally renegotiable by hospital h, when making the oers. 
A unique stable allocation {x 1 , z 2 } exists. The allocation could be unilaterally renegotiated by hospital h 1 by oeringx 1 instead of x 1 . However, the strategies X 1 (h 1 ) = {x 1 ,x 1 }, X 1 (h 2 ) = {x 2 , z 2 } jointly with the fact that a doctor selects the best set of contracts among the ones she was oered are an SP E yielding {x 1 , z 2 } as an outcome of the game induced by SAM . Examples 2 and 3 highlight the dierences that emerge from the use of contracts. These dierences lie in the structure both of the market and of the mechanism. Each hospital has to negotiate the nature of the relationship with the doctors, and the mechanism provides the hospitals with a rstmover advantage. In this case, the threat of other hospitals' counteroers helps in increasing competition and sustaining stable outcomes as shown in Example 3.
6 The idea that the potential entry of new competitors helps in sustaining ecient outcomes is not new to economics, and bears relation to the concept of contestable markets (see Baumol et al., 1982) . We thus provide the following denition. Denition 9 The market (H, D, X, ) satises contestability if, for any individually rational allocation Y , such that there exist x ∈ X \ Y and
The essence of the contestability condition is the existence of the threat of a deviation that introduces a potential competitive pressure and allows for full implementability of the set of stable allocations.
Proposition 2 Assume the market satises contestability, and the preferences of the agents are substitutable; then every stable allocation is an SP E outcome of the game induced by the SAM . Therefore, under contestability, the SAM implements the set of stable allocations in SP E.
In the absence of contracts, each allocation is an agreement only on the identities of the counterparts. Thus, the contestability condition holds emptily, SP E in a many-to-one matching model with money a la Kelso and Crawford (1982) . They use a mechanism that is very similar to the SAM . Their model satises contestability, because they assume that at least two rms exist, each rm nds every worker acceptable, and rms can make arbitrarily high 6 Hateld and Kominers (2017) prove the theoretical possibility of implementing the set of stable allocations in N E, although employing Maskin mechanisms.
oers. These assumptions allow them to sustain SP E, preventing unilateral deviation with the threat of a suciently high oer. We cannot extend these assumptions in our framework, because the set of contracts is nite, and we do not assume contracts between every rm and worker are feasible or acceptable. Therefore, the contestability condition is more demanding in our framework.
Equilibrium existence
In general, as Example 2 shows, not every stable allocation is an SP E outcome of the game induced by SAM . Therefore, the existence of stable allocations is not able to guarantee the existence of an SP E in pure strategies of the game induced by SAM .
We will prove the existence of equilibria directly, without relying on previous existence results, by using a lattice theoretical argument. To simplify the analysis, considering the normal form game Γ, where the set of the players is H, the strategy space of the hospital h is S h = 2 X h , and the outcome function
, g is useful. Thus, from Lemma 1, it follows directly that a one-to-one correspondence exists between the N E of Γ and the SP E of the game induced by the SAM .
Lemma 2 The strategy prole (S
is an equilibrium of the game induced by the SAM if and only if (S * h ) h∈H is a Nash equilibrium of Γ.
Let S −h be a strategy prole for all the hospitals but h. Let 
be the set of contracts that would be accepted if they were oered by h, when the other hospitals oer contracts
h ∈H S h ∪ {x} be the set of contracts of agent h that would be rejected if they were offered by h jointly with the contracts in h ∈H S h . Notice
We rst characterize the structure of the best response correspondence of game Γ, by proving br
The result on Lemma 3 characterizes the hospitals best responses in game Γ when the SAM is used. The next step is to prove the existence of equilibrium when hospitals have substitutable preferences and doctors have unilateral substitutable preferences. The strategy of proof is to provide an increasing selection of the best response correspondence and apply the Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem. First, we order the strategy space using the product of the natural set order, ⊆. Because the minimal best response function br h (·) is non-increasing, a natural choice would be the maximal best response BR h (·). However, BR h (·)
is not increasing as the following example shows.
Example 4 Let us assume
Assume the preferences of the agents are the following:
Notice x is unilaterally substitutable but not substitutable, because
Now ho Algorithm
Step 0:
Step r ≥ 1:
hp Algorithm
Step r ≥ 1: 
Preferences h are unilateral substitutable but not substitutable, because
The allocation Y = {y 1 , x 2 , z 2 } is pairwise stable but not stable, because it is blocked by N = {h,
When one side of the market has unilateral substitutable preferences, the set of pairwise stable allocations might not be a lattice. Moreover, under the same assumptions, the set of SP E is not even a lattice with respect to the joint preferences of the agents or Blair's order (see Blair, 1988 
This market contains three pairwise stable allocations, X 1 = {x 2 , y 2 }, X 2 = {x 3 , y 1 } , and X 3 = {x 1 , y 3 } , that are also SP E outcomes. However, as observed in Hateld and Kojima (2010), {X 1 , X 2 , X 3 } is not a lattice with respect to the order induced by D and not even with respect to the Blair's order.
The structure of the set of SP E outcomes
In this section, we restrict our attention to markets where the preferences of both sides of the market are substitutable. We rst prove that, under this assumption, the maximal best response BR h (·) is increasing.
Lemma 4 Assume H and D are substitutable. Then the maximal best
Lemma 4 implies the set of xed points of BR H (·) is a non-empty lattice.
To apply this result to our environment, we prove all SP E outcomes of the game induced by the SAM are generated by the set of xed points of the maximal best response. As in the case of Proposition 3, Proposition 4 also provides the following algorithms to compute pairwise stable allocations.
HO Algorithm
Set X HO = h∈H (Xr) h , wherer = min {r | (X r ) h = (X r+1 ) h for all h ∈ H}.
HP Algorithm
Lemmas 4 and 5 imply the outcome of the HO algorithm coincides with the best (resp. worst) SP E outcome for hospitals (resp. doctors), and the HP algorithm coincides with the worst (resp. best) SP E outcome for hospitals (resp. doctors). The existence of contracts provides hospitals with a rst-mover advantage as shown in Example 2. This eect shrinks the set of SP E allocations through unilateral deviations, and hurts doctors more than hospitals. Indeed, although the doctor-optimal stable allocation can be excluded from the set of SP E outcomes, as we have seen in Example 2, the hospital-optimal stable allocation is always an SP E outcome. 
Take-It-Or-Leave-It Oers Mechanisms
We now introduce the class of take-it-or-leave-it oers mechanisms.
This class extends the SAM by relaxing the assumption that the agents accept the proposals they receive simultaneously. The T OM are such that, in a rst stage, hospitals make simultaneous oers to doctors. Then groups of doctors sequentially accept or reject the oers they received. Doctors in the same group choose simultaneously. The order of choice can be arbitrary and/or endogenous to the play, which is history dependent. The contracts accepted in the choice stage are enforced as an outcome of the mechanism.
The take-it-or-leave-it oers mechanisms are described by the following procedure:
Oers. Each hospital h oers contracts to some doctors. Let X 1 (h) ⊆ X h be the set of contracts oered by hospital h. If h does not make any oer, then Formally, a T OM is an extensive-form mechanism T = (N, X, I, S, g) with the following characteristics. At the initial history i 0 ,
, where
Notice that in a T OM, the strategy space of a doctor d depends only on the oer she receives at Stage 0. In her turn, every doctor has a strictly dominant strategy, which is to accept the best oers that she receives. Let
T be a T OM, and consider the game induced by T when preferences are .
Lemma 6 Doctors have a unique best response X * i
The result is analogous to Lemma 1. Notice the result implies the set of SP E outcomes coincides with the set of N E outcomes of game Γ. Therefore, we have Proposition 6 The set of SP E outcomes of T coincides with the set of SP E outcomes of the SAM .
In particular, all the results of Section 3 extend to all the mechanisms on the class of T OM .
8 Notice we are abusing notation. In order to be completely consistent with the denition of an extensive-form mechanism, we should write, for instance, 
Centralized Markets
In many markets, clearing houses are already in use, as is the case, for instance, with the school admission procedures in place in many school districts. As mentioned in the introduction, a many-to-many matching market with contracts is arguably the most accurate representation of school admission models given that a signicant number of families have more than one child and dierent arrangements between schools and families are possible (e.g., dierent tuition fees, schedules, lunch options, or grants). However, school admission problems have been modeled as a many-to-one matching market, allowing for minor adjustments on school priorities to favor siblings.
Let us now consider the problem of centralizing the assignment of students to schools as a many-to-many matching market with contracts. The objective is to provide a centralized mechanism able to implement stable allocations.
Because no strategy-proof, stable revelation mechanism exists in this frame-work, we pursue the stability of the Nash equilibrium outcomes.
To maintain the concordance with the rest of the paper, we call the agents on each side of the market hospitals and doctors, respectively. As is usual in this case (see, e.g., Ergin and Sönmez, 2006 , and Haeringer and Klijn, 2009), we assume the hospital priorities are known to doctors, and we consider strategic behavior only among the latter.
Formally, the problem is characterized by the following:
• a set of hospitals H,
• a vector of quotas (q h ) h∈H , where q h is a positive integer that represents the number of doctors hospital h ∈ H can sign,
• a set of contracts X,
• a strict priority structure H , where, for all h ∈ H, h is a strict order over X h ∪ {∅},
• for all doctors d ∈ D, a strict preference prole d over X ∪ {∅} .
We need to extend hospitals' priorities over doctors to priorities over sets of doctors. To do so, we assume that priorities over a set of doctors are responsive to priorities over individual doctors. Formally, we say the prole˜ H is responsive to the priority structure H with a vector of quotas (q h ) h∈H if
Responsive priorities are substitutable and satisfy the law of aggregate demand, so our previous results extend to this framework.
Contrary to the previous sections, from now on, we consider T OM mechanisms where doctors make the proposals, because we are interested in designing an admission mechanism for doctors.
It is a well-known fact (see Roth and Sotomayor, 1990 ) that, in a many-tomany framework, no stable revelation mechanism exists where truth-telling is a dominant strategy for the agents on either side of the market. Thus, we turn our attention to the stability of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
A natural candidate for the centralization is the doctor-optimal stable mechanism. However, it may produce unstable allocations as N E outcomes (see Haeringer and Klijn, 2009 ). An alternative to the doctor-optimal stable mechanism is the DO algorithm. However, even if the DO algorithm does not coincide with the cumulative oer algorithm, its outcome coincides with the doctor-optimal stable allocation when preferences are substitutable and satisfy the law of aggregate demand.
Alternatively, we can focus on the incentives provided by the so-called immediate acceptance mechanism (see Alcalde, 1996) , also known as the Boston 
The following procedure describes the immediate acceptance mechanism.
• Step 1: Only the top acceptable choices of the doctors at D are con-
signed. Every doctor who has signed a contract and every doctor who has proposed the empty set, that is, •
Step r, r ≥ 2: Only the r th choices of doctors in D r are considered, and hospitals decide which contracts to add to the ones selected at step r−1, compatibly with the already signed contracts. Set
doctor who has signed a contract and every doctor who has proposed the empty set, that is, 
We consider the game Γ introduced in Section 3.1.2, where doctors make proposals.
Proposition 7 Assume D are substitutable and H are responsive; then the set of N E outcomes of Γ coincides with the set of N E outcomes of IA.
Thus, the set of N E outcomes of the immediate acceptance mechanism is a non-empty lattice of stable allocations that includes the doctor-optimal stable allocation.
9
Unfortunately, in situations where priorities are not responsive (e.g., in cases involving budget constraints; see, e.g., Mongell and Roth, 1986 , and Abizade, 2016, or when students are ranked using scores systems that give extra points to siblings simultaneously entering a new school), the immediate acceptance mechanism may fail to implement even individually rational allocations.
Example 8 Let us assume
The result follows from Corollary 1, Proposition 4, and Proposition 5.
Priorities and preferences are the following:
The outcome of truth-telling in the immediate acceptance algorithm results in the following allocation:
, which is not individually rational, because h 1 would like to re d 2 . However, truth-telling is an N E because any agent but d 1 is assigned to her preferred hospital, but d 1 has no protable deviations.
The failure of the immediate acceptance mechanism in implementing individually rational allocations relies on the multiple-round structure of the mechanism. Therefore, we consider the game derived from the immediate acceptance mechanism, where the rst-round allocation, Y 1 , is thenal one. We call this mechanism the one-shot immediate acceptance mechanism. Formally, let D = ( d ) d∈D be a prole of preferences for doctors, and let ( h ) h∈H be hospital priorities.
The game induced by the one-shot immediate acceptance
Notice the structure of OS is very similar to the structure of game Γ, where doctors make the proposal. Indeed, the Nash equilibrium outcomes of the two games coincide.
Proposition 8 The set of N E outcomes of the game induced by the one-shot immediate acceptance mechanism coincides with the set of N E outcomes of game Γ. Then a) All N E outcomes of OS are pairwise stable allocations. d) If are substitutable, the set of N E outcomes of OS is a non-empty lattice with respect to the Blair's order. e) If D are substitutable and satisfy the law of aggregate demand and H are substitutable, the hospital-optimal stable allocation is an N E outcome of
OS.
The immediate acceptance mechanism and the one-shot immediate acceptance mechanism are equivalent when priorities are responsive. However, when one relaxes the assumption of complete information, the one-shot immediate acceptance mechanism makes an agent more likely to end without signing any contract, preventing an ecient allocation from being achieved.
The immediate acceptance mechanism allows information to be revealed and agents' preferences to be expressed along the dierent stages of the mechanism as the following example shows.
Example 9 Let H = {h 1 , h 2 } and let D = {d 1 , d 2 }. Doctors only know their own preferences. The priority of the hospitals are
Each hospital has quota q = 1. Each doctor can be of two independent types a or b. The preferences of the doctors are represented by the following utility functions: , the one-shot immediate acceptance mechanism always yields a strictly higher interim expected payo than the immediate acceptance mechanism to doctor d 2 .
Conclusions
In this paper, we have studied a simple mechanism called the simultaneous acceptance mechanism or SAM . The SAM is a take-it-or-leave-it mechanism where hospitals make their oers simultaneously and then doctors accept or reject them simultaneously. The mechanism is well known and mimics realworld environments, allowing us to explore the allocative implications of the use of contracts in many-to-many matching markets.
The SAM generalizes previous results in many-to-many matching markets (Sotomayor, 2004; Echenique and Oviedo, 2006) to the many-to-many matching markets with contracts environment. The SAM also allows us to prove the existence of pairwise stable allocations when one side of the market has substitutable preferences and the other side has unilaterally substitutable preference. This extends the existence result provided by Hateld and Kominers (2017) . Moreover, when restricted to the many-to-one case, the procedures We extend our ndings on the SAM to the general class of take-it-or-leave-it oers mechanisms or T OM . All the mechanisms in this newly dened class weakly implement the set of pairwise stable allocations in SP E when the doctors' preferences are unilaterally substitutable and hospitals' preferences are substitutable. The SAM is not the only mechanism in the T OM class that has been previously analyzed in the literature. Another interesting element of the TOM class is the mechanism where doctors accept proposals one at a time in an order that has been previously established at the beginning of the game. This member of the TOM class extends the mechanisms introduced by Romero-Medina and Triossi (2014) (see also Klaus and Klijn, 2016 ) to many-to-many matching markets with contracts.
The inability of the mechanism in the T OM class to fully implement the set of pairwise stable allocation when the preferences are unilaterally substitutable gives us insight on the strategic limitation of the market mechanism. These limitations are important, because a class of simple sequential mechanisms is able to perform well in a complex environment.
Finally, we apply our ndings to the school admissions problem. We show the extension of the school choice problem to the many-to-many case is not trivial, because we can no longer rely on strategy-proof mechanisms. However, we can guarantee the allocation of stable allocations in equilibria of the immediate acceptance mechanism as long as schools have responsive priorities.
If the priorities of the schools are not responsive, the immediate acceptance mechanism can produce allocations that are not individually rational. In this case, the one-shot immediate acceptance mechanism guarantees the implementation of stable allocations.
We rst prove Y is an individually rational allocation. The proof of the claim is by contradiction. Assume Y is not an individually rational allocation for agent n ∈ N . Let n = h ∈ H; then C h (Y h ) is a protable deviation, from IRC, yielding a contradiction. Let n = d ∈ D; in this case, the contradiction follows from Lemma 1.
We conclude the proof by showing Y is not pairwise blocked. By contradiction, assume a hospital h, a doctor d, and a contract x ∈ X \ Y exist with 
Because Y is pairwise stable, preferences are substitutable and 
To complete the proof of the claim, we show br
The following Lemmas 7 and 8 will be used in the proof of Proposition 3. In particular, Lemma 7 will be repeatedly used in the proof of Lemma 8.
Lemma 7 (i)
(iv) Assume D are unilaterally substitutable and H are substitutable. Let
, which concludes the proof of the claim.
(v) The claims follows directly from the denition of substitutability of D .
The next result will be used in the proof of Propositions 3 and 4.
Lemma 8 Assume D are unilaterally substitutable and H are substitutable.
Proof. (i) The proof of the result follows from (iii) and (iv) of Lemma 7 above.
Proof of Proposition 3. The result follows directly from Lemmas 8 and 7.
Proof of Lemma 4. To complete the proof, it suces to show
We prove the claim by contradiction.
Proof of Lemma 5. The set of xed points of BR is a subset of the set of Nash equilibrium of Γ, so it suces to show that any N E outcome is the outcome of a xed point of BR. Let X be an SP E outcome, and let (Y h ) h∈H be an N E of Γ yielding X as outcome. 
